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ABSTRACT:  This chapter presents an overview of the theoretical law and 
economics literature on the burden of proof within tort law.  I begin by clarifying 
core legal definitions within this topic, demonstrating that the burden of proof 
actually refers to at least five doctrinal concepts that substantially overlap but are 
not completely interchangeable.  I then provide a conceptual roadmap for 
analyzing the major extant contributions to this topic within theoretical law and 
economics, emphasizing three key dimensions that organize them: (a) where they 
fall in the positive-normative spectrum; (b) what type of underlying modeling 
framework they employ (ranging from decision theoretic to game theoretic to 
mechanism design); and (c) whether they focus on litigation activity or primary 
activities (or both).  In the aggregate, the resulting theoretical landscape is a 
complex one, yielding a number of interesting insights. Yet it still suffers from 
having no single unified theory.  I conclude by offering a number of 
recommendations about where applied law and economics scholars interested this 
topic could direct their research efforts. 
  




Since nearly its very inception, law and economics (L&E) scholarship has contributed 
important and valuable insights about how “substantive” legal rules in general—and tort law in 
particular—can affect behavior and economic welfare.  Like other vehicles of regulation and 
taxes, the contours of tort law (such as negligence standards, affirmative defenses, damages 
measurement, and the like) directly distort individual incentives, risk allocations, activity levels, 
cost realizations and wealth/income distributions.   The collective observations of L&E scholars 
about the efficiency attributes of tort law are real and rich, and they have informed legal policy-
making and reform efforts for much of the last half century. 
That said, arguably a more distinct contribution of L&E scholarship on torts may lie not 
with its considerable insights about substantive law (an analytic approach common to much of 
welfare economics), but rather with its (arguably) less heralded insights about the procedural 
rules through which law operates.  Unlike conventional mechanisms of public policy, the legal 
system embodies an idiosyncratic set of traditional (and highly cherished) rules and processes—
many of which themselves introduce special forms of incentives, risks, and strategic behavior 
among litigants and other stakeholders.  Consequently, the application of legal process through 
courts (and other quasi-judicial actors) bears a heavy hand in mediating both the delivery and 
consequential impact of substantive law.   
It is therefore hardly surprising that the last four decades have spawned a rich sub-
literature in L&E centering on how the legal process itself—including the rules, protocols and 
traditions to which it subscribes—operates to alter outcomes of litigation, and in so doing 
incentives and allocations in ways that could either promote or frustrate the operation and policy 
goals of substantive law.  Any efficiency-minded legal reformer advocating prescriptive reform 
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to substantive legal rules who ignores the procedural implementation of such reforms does so at 
her peril.   
Within the broad array of topics germane to the legal process, there is probably none so 
central as the allocation of the (so-called) “Burden of Proof” (BoP) in litigation.  Although it 
may appear upon first blush to bear the marker of a “mere” procedural formality, the BoP is far 
from it.  To the contrary, the BoP embodies the very decision-making structure that animates and 
defines legal order itself.  Indeed, as most judges and practitioners are fond of observing, in 
many practical instances these seeming procedural formalities often substantially determine the 
outcome of a case. 
This criticality of process in general—and the BoP in particular—may be especially 
salient in cases where the economic stakes are high, and where the informational environment is 
complex, opaque, and difficult to navigate.  In such situations, it is plausible that no single 
entity—not the jury, not the judge, not attorneys, not the parties themselves—has full and 
complete command of all the “facts” pertinent to a legal dispute.  It is here where the burden 
allocation may be the most influential in catalyzing information discovery, reducing verification 
costs, and ultimately contributing to overall welfare policy goals. 
This chapter reviews the conceptual nature of the BoP, and organizes and catalogues the 
L&E contributions to this literature, assessing how law and economics scholarship has both 
sharpened and complicated our understanding of how evidentiary burdens plausibly operate in 
practice, how they should operate, and how economic welfare-minded policy-makers can 
incorporate such insights into practical prescriptive reforms. 2  In the end, I conclude that the 
literature on BoP has spawned a large number of interesting and durable insights about how 
                                                            
2 In the balance of this chapter, I will tend to use the term “economic welfare” rather than “efficiency” under the 
premise that the former is a more general term, capable of incorporating (for example) distributive desiderata as well 
as conventional efficiency-oriented aims. 
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substantive and procedural law interact with one another.   At yet, at the same time, the range of 
methodologies and objectives reflected in this literature is still so broad as to elude easy 
categorization or simple prescriptive sound bites.  Consequently, I conjecture, the L&E literature 
on the burden of proof is likely to make significant contributions to practical legal policy only 
when L&E scholars are better able to unify, test and, for want of a better term, “market” its 
insights to practitioners. 
One caveat deserves explicit mention before proceeding.  My focus in this essay will 
predominantly center on theoretical models of the BoP within the relevant law and economics 
literature (rather than empirical or experimental contributions).  This is in part because of 
unavoidable space constraints, and in part because most of the significant contributions 
heretofore have come through theory.  It is likely that the next phases of inquiry will be more 
evenly divided, however, between theory, empiricism, and experimentalism.  Accordingly, at the 
end of this essay when I chart a course for future research, my recommendations will tend to fall 
along all three methodological dimensions. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  Section II provides a brief 
conceptual overview of the core legal concepts that surround the burden of proof, and how they 
are conceived of within traditional legal parlance.  Here I illustrate that, far from being a 
monolithic concept, the “burden” of proof is more akin to a composite of at least five 
interlocking concepts.3  The precise application and interaction of these concepts, however, 
remain somewhat elusive notwithstanding an immense literature discussing and dissecting 
them—a state of play that simultaneously confounds and invites economic analysis.  Section III 
turns to the economic analysis of the burden of proof, and catalogues major L&E contributions to 
                                                            
3 Those are: the burden of production, the burden of persuasion, evidentiary standards, and legal presumptions and 
legal assumptions. I do not classify (nor do most other commentators) the “burden of pleading” as part of this group. 
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the field along three different dimensions: (a) The normative/positive spectrum; (b) modeling 
approaches employed; and (c) scope of inquiry.  Section IV concludes, offering thoughts for 
future work in the field. 
2. Definitional Dark Matter 
Before reviewing the law and economics literature on the topic, it is necessary first to 
understand—or at least appreciate—the rough doctrinal contours of the burden of proof.   This is 
no mean feat: As recently as 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court described the BoP as “one of the ‘the 
slipperiest members of the family of legal terms.’ ”  Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship (2011); 
Schaffer ex rel Schaffer v. Weast (2005).   
The doctrinal slipperiness of the BoP has at least two important implications for 
economic analysis.  First, it presents a challenge for those who aspire to model the burden of 
proof theoretically, and particularly those who wish to posit a model that comports (at least to 
some extent) with existing legal practices.4 The task of such efforts clearly is made more difficult 
by the lack of a consistent, precise verbal definition among many legal practitioners.  Second, it 
also presents something of a constructive opportunity for law and economics scholars, whose 
efforts might provide insights into what a welfare-minded BoP should look like.  Such 
contributions may be of significant assistance in helping scholars of torts, evidence and 
procedure develop sharper and more precise definitions of the relevant terms. 
In practice, 5  the term “burden of proof” bundles together at least five inter-related 
phenomena, which scholars, practitioners and laypeople alike tend intermittently to reorganize, 
redefine, contest and conflate.  The first—and most intuitive—phenomenon is commonly 
                                                            
4 As discussed below, the extent to which an economic / game theoretic model of legal process should “fit” extant 
practices depends on the objectives of the scholarly enterprise.   
5 The description in the text comes from the Model Code of Evidence’s definitions, but in some states—such as 
California—the term “Burden of Proof” denotes what is more widely identified as the Burden of Persuasion. 
7 
 
referred to the Burden of Persuasion.  This burden articulates how, once all evidence is 
submitted, courts will weigh the offered evidence from either side, deciding remaining 
uncertainties about contested claims.  The party charged with the burden of persuasion 
legitimately carries a “burden,” because it is she who must present enough probative evidence to 
convince the fact-finder that her case is sufficiently “strong” to warrant a verdict in her favor.6   
Should the plaintiff fail in this regard, by implication, she has failed to satisfy her Burden of 
Persuasion, and the other side prevails.7   
As a default rule in most civil cases within Anglo-American courts, burden of persuading 
the fact finder that liability is present generally rests with the plaintiff.  Even without economic 
analysis to justify it, this default allocation of the burden of persuasion makes great intuitive 
sense as a litigation- and enforcement-cost saving device, since it is the plaintiff who (usually) 
advocates a change from the status quo ante (at least before litigation).8   As a general matter, the 
party bearing the burden of persuasion remains constant during litigation (though affirmative 
defenses raise interesting analytic puzzles, as discussed below). 
The second related term is the “Standard of Proof.” 9   This term specifies criteria for 
applying the burden of persuasion.  In other words, it specifies how far the party bearing the 
burden of persuasion must push the judicial fact-finder’s assessment in order to prevail in her 
legal claim. (See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, at n.4).   Borrowing on a Bayesian/Quasi-
Bayesian account (to which I return again in later sections),10 there are many different standards 
                                                            
6 In a canonical negligence claim in torts, this involves proving multiple elements, including the existence of a duty, 
its breach by lack of due care, actual causation of injury, proximate causation of the injury, and resulting damages.  
Whether the plaintiff must establish these elements one by one versus jointly is a topic I take up below. 
7 The party bearing the burden of persuasion is sometimes said analytically to also bear the concomitant risk of non-
persuasion. See, e.g., Winter (1971). 
8 Id. 
9 This is sometimes referred to alternatively as the “evidence threshold” (Kaplow 2012). 
10 The term “Bayesian” refers to the process by which a statistically-minded decision maker marshals available 
information to update her probabilistic beliefs about the world. In the present context, the relevant decision maker is 
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of proof in litigation, ranging—in ascending order—from “preponderance of evidence” common 
in civil litigation (something akin to a 51% Bayesian confidence assessment), to “clear and 
convincing evidence” (perhaps on the order of 70-80%), to “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
common to criminal proceedings (perhaps on the order of  95% or more). 
The third related term is the Burden of Production.  This is a procedural rule identifying 
which party is required to submit information or evidence about the case if she wishes to alter a 
(possibly interim) legal conclusion in a she desires.  At least initially, in most civil litigation 
cases, the burden of production and the burden of persuasion both fall on the plaintiff.  
Nevertheless, the Burden of Production differs from the Burden of Persuasion in at least 
two important respects. First, unlike the Burden of Persuasion, which explicitly weighs 
previously submitted evidence of one party against that of the other, the Burden of Production is 
what regulates the (usually) sequential process by which those pieces of evidence are provided to 
the fact-finder.  When a plaintiff bearing the Burden of Persuasion brings forth evidence 
which—if wholly uncontroverted by the defendant—would satisfy the Standard of Proof, then 
the plaintiff is frequently said to have made out a prima facie case, satisfying her burden of 
production, and allowing the case to be decided by the fact-finder.  However, that is not the end 
of the case because the defendant now has the opportunity to refute the plaintiff’s evidence or 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
a judicial fact-finder (either jury or judge).  The process of updating follows what is known as “Bayes' rule,” which 
states (for the case of discrete random variables) that the probability of an event A occurring, conditional on 
knowing that some other event B has occurred (or Pr[A|B]) can be derived from a combination of the respective 
“base rate” probabilities of A and B (or Pr[A] and Pr[B]) and the “reverse conditional” probability that B occurs, 
conditional on knowing that A has occurred (or Pr[B|A]). These four probabilities are related to one another 




.   
For example, suppose that one were attempting to use the outcome of a diagnostic test to infer whether a medical 
patient was carrying a deadly virus. And suppose further that when administered to people who are known to have 
the virus, the test yields a positive result 50% of the time. Moreover, among the general population, the test yields a 
positive result 25% of the time, and 10% of the general population carries the virus. Using Bayes' rule, it is possible 
to calculate the probability that an individual who has tested positive also carries the virus is equal to 20%, twice the 
unconditional base rate in the population (but still less than 50% likely that she has the disease). 
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adduce contrary evidence of her own.  Thus, while the Burden of Persuasion as to a particular 
claim remains largely constant through litigation, the Burden of Production is sometimes said to 
oscillate in contingent fashion as each side proffers its evidence.11   
The second major difference is that unlike the Burden of Persuasion (where the ultimate 
question of satisfying the burden is up to the fact-finder), the assignment and assessment of the 
Burden of Production is solely the province of the judge.  Failure of a plaintiff to adduce 
evidence satisfying her initial Burden of Production, for example, can justify a dismissal or 
directed verdict in the defendant’s favor without ever being put to a jury.  A similar implication 
frequently may work in the reverse direction, particularly when a defendant asserts affirmative 
defense (such as claiming contributory negligence by the plaintiff in a torts case).  As to this 
affirmative defense, the defendant would bear (at least initially) the burdens of persuasion and 
production.  Should she fail to produce sufficient evidence to substantiate the defense, the judge 
will instruct the jury to ignore it. 
The final “nearby” definition concerns the overlapping terms of legal assumptions and 
presumptions. These are perhaps the most slippery concepts in the field, and their precise 
interpretations (and particularly that of presumptions) remain inconsistent and heavily contested. Under 
the simplest definitions, assumptions and presumptions are respectively the default conditions – 
and thus the analytic duals – for the burdens of persuasion and production.  Assumptions fix 
initial conditions in light of the Burden of Persuasion. In typical cases (civil and criminal), the 
initial assumption is that the defendant is not liable, and the act of dislodging this assumption is 
                                                            
11 See, e.g., Wigmore (1940)  §§ 2489; 2494.  This “shifting” view of the burden of production is frequently 
disputed among evidence scholars, with some viewing the burden of production as nothing more than a lower bound 
for what evidentiary showing is necessary for the petitioning party’s case to go to the fact-finder.  Accordingly, 
under this account, should the petitioning party satisfy her burden of production, the “burden” does not shift, as 
much as the non-petitioning side now bears a risk of liability if she does not endeavor to counter the petitioner’s 
evidence. See, e.g., Wright et al. (2012) § 5122. Declaring the victor of this battle of the evidence-wonk bands is, 
thankfully, beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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coterminous with carrying one’s burden of persuasion (which, as noted above, remains fixed 
through trial12).  Presumptions, in contrast, fix initial conditions in light of the Burden of 
Production at various stages of trial, identifying which party must bear burden of going forward 
with evidence. “Rebutting” a presumption is therefore equivalent under this view to satisfying 
one’s burden of production as to a disputed issue.  Thus, as with the Burden of Production, 
presumptions are often said to shift back and forth as trial proceeds. 13 
As should be obvious from this brief overview, there is a rich and longstanding debate 
within evidence and civil procedure regarding the definition (and redefinition) of the elements 
that collectively constitute the burden of proof.  And with that debate is a significant literature on 
the topic, which takes a number of different perspectives ranging from formalistic to historical to 
expressive to positive to normative.14  The balance of this essay cannot do justice to the totality 
of this literature, and thus concentrates solely on positive and policy-oriented approaches that 
utilize economic analysis. 
3. Law and Economics Analysis of the Burden of Proof 
As noted above, the contested and sometimes elusive understanding of the Burden of 
Proof in legal discourse presents both a challenge for law and economics scholars writing in the 
field, as well as an opportunity for them (and others) to attempt to clarify the landscape.  The last 
four decades have borne witness to an interesting theoretical literature in law and economics on 
the topic.  Perhaps channeling the topic’s complex doctrinal landscape, L&E contributions in the 
                                                            
12 It is important to distinguish statement that the defendant is “assumed not liable” with the (stronger) Bayesian 
assertion that one’s prior probability assessment of the defendant’s liability is zero.  As described in greater detail 
infra at n.24, the latter statement would produce a pathological result in which – because of an inflexible prior 
probability assessment – no amount of evidence could ever be persuasive enough to lead to a finding of liability.  
13 As noted above, the term “presumption” often is invoked to sweep in concepts even broader than what is stated in 
the text.  For example, the term is at times employed to describe the burden of persuasion in an affirmative defense, 
or alternatively as tie-breaking decisional rules in cases where the evidence is unclear.  See Allen (1981) for an 
overview, as well as a critique of the highly elusive definition of presumption. 
14 Stein (2005) provides an excellent overview. 
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field have similarly tended to be multifaceted and heterogeneous, undertaking distinct and 
sometimes divergent approaches, depending on the goals of the research, the modeling decisions 
of the researcher, and the nature of the inquiry.  This section considers that heterogeneity along 
three different dimensions: (1) the contribution’s place on positive/normative spectrum; (2) the 
contribution’s theoretical modeling approach; and (3) the contribution’s place on the substantive 
law/legal process spectrum. 
A. The Normative/Positive Spectrum 
Like many other endeavors in the economic analysis of law, most contributions can be 
classified as either positive or normative.  Positive contributions within this area tend to take the 
existing BoP structures as given, analyzing how they shape various types of behavior (both 
during litigation and before), as well as generating falsifiable predictions about how various 
“shocks” or changes in BoP structures might alter that behavior.  Normative contributions, in 
contrast, tend to focus on desirable behavior (usually against a posited economic welfare 
measure), and the consequent social desirability of the status quo against a host of potential 
alternative institutional designs. 
Each of the approaches described above comes entail advantages and disadvantages, as 
well as different modeling desiderata.  Scholars interested in making purely (or primarily) 
positive contributions tend to focus on models whose details correspond (at least loosely) with 
the key institutional features of the BoP as articulated and practiced by courts. For example, all 
else constant, a positive model would preferably capture the central characteristics of burdens of 
persuasion and production, standards of proof, assumptions and presumptions as outlined in 
Section 2.  This makes perfect sense, since the goal of positive theory is to make predictions 
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about how existing institutions operates, thereby placing a premium on fidelity to institutional 
detail. 
For those interested in making purely (or predominantly) normative contributions, in 
contrast, institutional fidelity may be singularly unattractive, since it significantly constrains the 
task of designing and implementing wholesale reform.  Normative analyses, therefore, often tend 
to eschew modeling frameworks that unduly fetishize prevailing practice at the expense of 
prescriptive possibility.  Indeed, a key strength of normative analysis is its ability to evaluate 
longstanding institutional processes without assuming those traditions to be sacrosanct.15 
Both pure positive and pure normative approaches also have weaknesses, however.  Pure 
positive analysis may be unsatisfying to reform minded readers, while pure normative 
approaches may be too fanciful or abstract to implement in practice.  Perhaps recognizing these 
limitations, a third strand of the law and economics literature on burdens attempts (rather 
successfully) to occupy a prominent middle ground.  Such hybrid contributions, while seeking 
ultimately to deliver normative policy prescriptions, are also practically oriented around 
incremental improvements, suggesting tweaks to and reforms of existing institutional practices 
rather than a wholesale reinvention of litigation systems.  Consequently, theoretical contributions 
within this tradition necessarily must balance incorporating some core institutional details from 
evidence and civil procedure, leaving some degrees of freedom to consider the designs of central 
“parameters” of that system. Because each approach described above may be appropriate in 
certain situations, it should not be surprising that each—the purely positive, purely normative, 
and hybridized—is now quite common within the law and economics literature on the BoP.   
 
                                                            
15 Sometimes the object may also be to rationalize current practices by demonstrating that they are “optimal” in an 
economic welfare sense (or approximately so).  But even here, to be convincing at rationalizing current practice, the 
underlying model must be capable to generalize practices beyond the status quo ante. 
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B. Modeling Frameworks for the BoP 
A second significant dimension of heterogeneity in the law and economics literature on 
the BoP concerns the general conceptual framework that scholars adopt to analyze its operation.  
Although myriad variations exist, they most naturally fall into four distinct clusters: Decision-
theoretic analyses, Game-Theoretic frameworks, hybrid Game-Theoretic frameworks involving a 
Bayesian Fact-finder; and Mechanism-Design approaches. 
1. Decision Theoretic Frameworks 
Perhaps the simplest and most intuitive branch of the L&E scholarship on burdens adopts 
what one might call decision-theoretic perspective (Kaplan 1968; Easterbrook 1984; Hylton & 
Salinger 2001).  This approach trains exclusive (or near exclusive) focus on the decision problem 
facing the finder of fact, weighing the previously-submitted evidence in a case.  Under this 
approach, the fact-finder’s role is tantamount to a welfare-minded social planner, using adduced 
evidence to learn and make decisions within an information-constrained environment.  The 
evidence produced in a case enables an uncertain fact-finder to “update” her assessment of the 
case (possibly in a Bayesian manner) in light of that evidence (Feess et al. 2009). 
For example, suppose a court were attempting to assess whether a defendant had 
exercised due care in an automobile accident, and that the substantive negligence standard was 
triggered only if the defendant’s precautions, denoted as ∈ 0,∞ , fell below some articulated 
negligence standard ∗ 0.16  This would, of course, be an easy task to accomplish if the fact-
finder could directly observe the driver’s precautions.  The more interesting case occurs when 
the driver’s precautions are not directly observable, so that the fact finder must resort to looking 
towards observable “evidence” about v, such as the driver’s evident speed, whether his cell 
phone was in use in the time leading up to the accident, his driving record, and the like.  
                                                            
16 For simplicity, assume that v is a scalar value.  The analysis generalizes to vector-valued precautions. 
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Accordingly, denote this observable evidence as ∈ , and suppose this evidence 
provides noisy information about v.  Formally, suppose that v and x are distributed according to a 
prior density function f(v,x), with associated marginal densities of g(v) and h(x) for v and x, 
respectively.17  Having observed evidence x, the fact-finder can update its assessment in any 
number of ways. Perhaps the most intuitive updating process might be Bayes rule (e.g., Feess et 
al. 2009), under which the fact-finder uses the evidence observed to generate a posterior 
conditional probability density on the defendant’s actual behavior, | , .  (Note that so 
long as v and x are not completely statistically independent of one another, the evidence 
represented by x is statistically “probative,” so that this updated density will generally not 
coincide with the marginal distribution on v, or g(v)).  
The decision-maker could then utilize this information to assign liability according to the 
underlying substantive rule, perhaps weighing the relative costs associated with false positives 
(finding that the defendant was liable when in fact she met the negligence standard) and false 
negatives (finding that the defendant was not liable when in fact she fell short of the standard).  
For concreteness, suppose the decision maker cares about making “accurate” judgments, and that 
she receives a payoff normalized to be 0 whenever she correctly finds that the defendant was 
negligent (a “true positive”) or when she correctly finds the defendant was not negligent (a “true 
negative”).  On the other hand, the decision maker incurs a welfare loss of e1 whenever she 
                                                            
17 A density function, denoted f(y), is a standard way to express the probabilistic behavior of some continuously 
distributed random variable y, whose realizations – unlike discrete random variables – do not fall into countable, 
discrete outcomes.  Because there are infinitely many realizations for a continuous random variable, the probability 
of realizing any specific realization is effectively zero.  Nevertheless, one can characterize the probability of the 
outcome falling in some range [a,b]: This is simply the area under the density function between a and b. It is 
common to express the area under the density function to the left of some prescribed cutoff b using a cumulative 
distribution function, which is often denoted as F(b) = . Consequently, the probability of the outcome 
falling in range [a,b] could be expressed using this notation as F(b)-F(a). Perhaps the most well-known continuous 
density function is the Gaussian, or so-called “normal” distribution of a variable with mean  and variance .  The 
density function for a normally distributed variable z is given by:
√
.   
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incorrectly finds negligence when the defendant took due care (a “false positive”) and a loss of e2 
whenever she incorrectly finds non-negligence when the defendant was actually negligent (a 
“false negative”).  If the decision maker finds negligence, her expected payoff is the probability-
weighted value of her “true positive” and “false positive” contingent payoffs: 
       Pr ∗| ∙ 0 Pr ∗| ∙ 1 ∗| ∙         (1) 
where F(v*|z) denotes the cumulative distribution 18  associated with density function f(v|z) 
evaluated at v=v*.   If the decision maker finds no negligence, in contrast, her expected payoff is 
the probability weighted value of her “true negative” and “false negative” payoffs: 
          Pr ∗| 0 Pr ∗| ∗| ∙         (2) 
Combining expressions (1) and (2), it follows that a loss-minimizing decision maker will find 
liability if and only if the odds ratio of negligence to non-negligence is greater than the ratio of 
losses associated with Type 1 and Type 2 errors19: 
Pr	 	 	 |






In the special case where the decision-maker places equal weight on Type 1 and Type 2 
errors (e1 = e2), this condition simplifies down into requiring that the evidence be strong enough 
to satisfy a more-likely-than-not condition:  
Pr	 	 	 | Pr |  (4) 
Significantly, this condition corresponds to the description that commentators frequently identify 
with the preponderance of the evidence standard.  In contrast, when Type 1 errors are more 
costly than Type 2 errors (e1 > e2), the evidentiary standard would weigh evidence differently 
too.  When false positives are three times as costly as false negatives, for example, this critical 
                                                            
18 See note 17, supra. 
19 Recall the convention from probability theory that “Type 1” errors are false positives, and “Type 2” errors are 
false negatives.  (A “Type 3” error, in contrast, is the failure to keep straight which is which.) 
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cutoff increases from 50% to 75% (something akin to a clear and convincing standard).  When 
false positives are nineteen times more costly, the critical cutoff increases further to 95% 
(something akin to beyond reasonable doubt). 
 The above framework, moreover, is general enough to admit numerous generalizations.  
For example, suppose the observed realizations of evidence x were systematically related to 
underlying precaution levels v in an ordered fashion – that is, higher realizations of x predicted 
higher values of v.20 In such settings, the condition in (3) would imply the existence of a “cutoff” 
threshold for evidence -- say x* -- such that an evidentiary signal of x* or less would imply that 
the burden of persuasion has been met, and the court should find negligence.  Alternatively, one 
might imagine expanding the dimensionality of the framework, allowing for one dimension to 
capture the defendant’s precautions (and evidence about it), and another to capture the plaintiff’s 
precautions (and evidence about it).  Such generalizations would also allow the decision-
theoretic framework to capture both causes of action and affirmative defenses. 
 A decision-theoretic account also lends itself to analyzing (and in some ways 
complicating) the long-standing quandary about how to apply the BoP when the underlying 
cause of action has multiple conjunctive elements.  In both civil and criminal law settings, the 
traditional (albeit sometimes controversial) requirement is that in order to prevail, the petitioning 
party must prove “every element” of a legal claim by the applicable evidentiary standard.21  A 
common impression is that the every-element requirement favors the defendant, raising the 
degree of difficulty for the petitioning party to procure a victory.  While this impression possibly 
has merit, a decision-theoretic account can also complicate this understanding.  Consider, for 
example, a hypothetical cause of action that requires proof of two conjunctive elements, A and 
                                                            
20 Such might be the case, for example, if x constituted a “noisy” but unbiased observation of v, so that x = v + , 
where  denotes an error term with zero and a strictly positive variance (representing the observational noise). 
21 See, e.g., In re Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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B, and an applicable standard of proof consisting of a preponderance rule (i.e., a judicial 







Table 1:  Hypothetical Joint Posterior Probabilities of 
Presence / Absence of Required Elements 
 
Suppose that the available evidence were such that the fact-finder’s posterior assessment of the 
presence/absence of Elements A and B were as shown in Table 1 above.  Thus, the evidence 
produced at trial suggests that the contingency where Element A is present but Element B is 
absent (i.e., the southwest cell) occurs with probability , and similarly for all other 
combinations, so that each entry in the table represents a value falling between zero and one, and 
the cells collectively sum to 1.0 (or 100%).  
One plausible interpretation of an every-element requirement is that the petitioning party 
must prove each of (1) the presence of Element A in isolation by a preponderance (the left 
column of the table), and also prove (2) the presence of Element B in isolation by a 
preponderance (the top row).   Under this interpretation, from Table 1 above the plaintiff will 
succeed if both Pr[A] =  > 0.5 = 50% and Pr[B] =  > 0.5 = 50%, a burden that is 
equivalent to the condition that  + Min{} > 0.5.   
Now consider the plaintiff’s task were she subject not to an element-by-element 
requirement, but rather something else.  One plausible “something else” would be that the 
plaintiff must demonstrate the joint occurrence of Element A and Element B (or formally, ∩ ) 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  Here, Table 1 suggests that this would be equivalent to 
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showing Pr[ ∩ ] =  > 0.5, a condition that is more (not less) restrictive than the element-by-
element test.  In other words, relative to this alternative, an every-element test would make for a 
smoother (not bumpier) road to a plaintiff’s victory (and a defendant’s loss).22 
 As the discussion above indicates, the decision-theoretic framework has a number of 
ostensibly appealing characteristics.  It is intuitive. It uses foundational concepts from probability 
theory. It yields interpretations that tend to “fit” with at least some existing practices, and 
particularly the Burden of Persuasion, Assumptions, and Standards of Proof.  It can be used to 
analyze and frame various types of positive and normative analysis about the BoP.23  And it is 
capable of engaging with interesting current debates about evidentiary burdens.  For these 
reasons, perhaps, the decision-theoretic model has remained a popular modeling choice for 
evidentiary burdens among lay people and practitioners, garnering numerous adherents among 
law and economics scholars in the process.  
And yet, for all its intuitive appeal, the decision-theoretic framework also suffers from a 
number of potentially worrisome shortcomings that ultimately limit its utility as a tool for 
economic analysis.  First, the decision theoretic approach gives no guidance to the fact-finder 
about the appropriate “prior” beliefs to adopt at the onset of litigation, and how to update such 
prior beliefs with evidence.  It is well known in probability theory that “improper” prior beliefs 
                                                            
22 Much in this discussion turns on the “compared to what” question—specifically, how one portrays the alternative 
to an every-element test. Another plausible candidate might be a “sliding scale” standard, where the plaintiff can 
prevail if she proves only a subset of the substantive elements according to the standard of proof (or is allowed to 
prove some subset according to a discounted standard).  It is readily shown that the sliding-scale test as described 
here is indeed more plaintiff-friendly than the every-element test. Nevertheless, as this discussion suggests, the 
decision-theoretic frame helps to isolate important (and possibly confounding) intuitions in the debate. 
23 For example, while Kaplan (1968) and others use a decision-theoretic framework as a means of “gaining insights 
into our factfinding processes,” (id. at 1091), both Polinsky & Shavell (2000) and P’ng (1986) employ a decision-
theoretic framework as a backdrop to analyzing the optimal design of substantive legal rules in the presence of 
jurisprudential errors. Both Polinsky & Shavell (2000) and P’ng (1986) provide a normative argument for equal 
weighting of false negatives and false positives, in the case of zero litigation costs and risk neutral parties.  The 
game-theoretic literature discussed below retrains focus on how evidentiary standards affect litigation costs. 
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can be unreliable guideposts for statistical inference and Bayesian learning.24  Leaving this as an 
“open parameter” to be filled in by the fact finder may be a recipe for practical disaster. Many 
who apply a decision theoretic frame tend to neglect this issue even as they implicitly make 
assumptions about its size.25 
Second, even if a sophisticated decision maker had access to informed priors on available 
evidence and justiciable conduct, the decision-theoretic model provides an unsatisfactory 
account of how the evidence (x) makes its way to the fact-finder.  To the contrary, evidence falls 
from the metaphorical sky, like manna (or at least manila file folders) from heaven.  The process 
by which each side uses, produces, authenticates, cross-examines, or rebuts evidence is 
substantially black-boxed within this approach (or at least kept offstage). Such a modeling choice 
has obvious problems for those interested in positive theory, since the framework delivers few 
predictions about how litigants are likely to behave (and at what economic cost), or how that 
behavior might change if one (say) inverted the underlying burdens or changed requisite 
standard. Moreover, the strategic means by which parties search for and present evidence in 
practice almost certainly implies that the fact-finder will observe a biased draw of evidence from 
the proverbial Bayesian evidence urn – a factor generally suppressed for in the decision-theoretic 
frame (cf. Daughety & Reinganum (2000)).  As a result, despite its intuitive allure, the decision-
                                                            
24 A classic puzzle/paradox in Bayseian reasoning, originally attributed to Kraitchik (1953), provides an entertaining 
example of this problem.  You and an “opponent” are each allocated (at random) one of two sealed envelopes that 
contain monetary prizes.  You are both told nothing about the magnitudes of the prizes in the two envelopes, other 
than the fact that one prize is twice as large as the other.  You open your envelope, revealing M dollars.  You reason 
that your counterpart’s envelope is equally likely to have either 2M or ½M dollars in it, and accordingly you 
compute the expected value of her envelope to be 1.25M = ½ (2M + ½M).  Sensing a profit opportunity, you coyly 
ask your opponent if she wishes to trade envelopes.  To your surprise, she has been doing exactly the same 
calculation, and she eagerly agrees.  The reasoning described above presents a paradox, because neither contestant 
has any information about whether her envelope contains the most, and they both know that exchanging envelopes is 
zero sum game; yet each of them appears to have a strict preference for switching.  The paradox occurs because the 
reasoning of both players (described above) depends erroneously on the Bayesian updating of an “improper” prior 
distribution on (0,∞).  For a longer explanation of the paradox and its resolution, see Christensen & Utts (1992). 
25 For example, Kaplan’s (1968) seminal paper utilizing the decision theoretic approach recognizes the criticality of 
specifying prior beliefs, but offers little in the way providing guidance other than to suggest that they should be 
somewhere between ½ and 1 in 200 million. 
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theoretic framework is poorly equipped to analyze how evidentiary burdens operate through 
litigation, since the underlying approach is simply not a theory that has much to do with 
litigation in the first instance.26 
Finally, even putting the foregoing objections aside, the decision-theoretic framework 
provides only limited traction about how one should weigh (or even think about) Type 1 and 
Type 2 errors in a broader sense. Although there are some notable exceptions,27 judicial errors 
frequently appear in decision-theoretic frameworks as unadorned costs whose value is 
determined outside the model, with little context or evaluation behind them from an underlying 
welfare economics theory.  In fact, there is some reason to believe that the decision-theoretic 
framework described above is a strange bedfellow with robust economic theories of welfare, 
particularly the frequently-made assumption that all Type 1 errors (or Type 2 errors) have equal 
intensities within their own categorization ranks.  For instance, there is little reason to believe 
that the nature and consequences of a false positive when the defendant had “barely” complied 
with the negligence standard have the same welfare implications as in situations where the 
defendant’s precautions were highly supererogatory.  Consequently, the decision theoretic 
approach provides a helpful—but somewhat incomplete—vehicle for making normative 
assessments of the burden of proof within law and economics. 
 
                                                            
26 As an anonymous referee correctly points out, the critique that the decision theoretic model is incomplete may 
also be applicable to the other modeling tools below.  Indeed, as I discuss in the concluding section infra, the project 
of developing a unified, all-inclusive, and tractable model of evidence production and primary behavior is still a 
significant challenge to this literature.  Accord  Kaplow (2012). 
27 The most notable of these are Polinsky & Shavell (2000) and P’ng (1986), who embed a decision theoretic 
account of litigation in an ex ante model of deterrence.  I discuss these papers at greater length in Section 3C, infra. 
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2. Game Theoretic Frameworks 
More recent contributions have focused on developing alternative frameworks that are 
better able to capture the incentives and behavior of litigants (focusing less on the decision 
theoretic issues for the fact-finder).  One particularly influential framework in the literature 
conceives of evidentiary burdens as setting the rules for a non-cooperative litigation game of 
“evidence production,” where the litigants, acting simultaneously or sequentially, adduce 
(potentially conflicting) evidence with the intent to influence the ultimate judgment of the court.  
This literature draws considerable influence from other branches of economics that study 
redistributive “contests,” including the literatures on political rent-seeking, lobbying, and 
international conflict (e.g., Tullock 1980; Hirschleifer 1991; Skaperdas 1996).    
The intuitive idea behind such litigation games is relatively straightforward.  Litigation, 
under this view, serves as a performative venue where litigants engage in what amounts to a 
costly arms race to send signals about the strength of their case to the fact-finder.  The more 
evidence a litigant can muster, the framework posits, the better his chances of prevailing.  While 
it may seem wasteful on first blush to design a system that encourages this type of costly 
litigiousness, it turns out that such mechanisms can be welfare enhancing so long as the 
production of evidence serves as a valuable signal about the merits of the party’s position that are 
not already known to the fact-finder.  Such a signaling role is possible, in turn, if parties with the 
most righteous cases also find it relatively cheaper (on the margin) to add evidence into the 
record.   
In such situations, a judicial rule that invites costly evidence production as a strategic 
maneuver may serve as an effective verification device to separate deserving from non-deserving 
parties.  Moreover, knowing that such a costly verification device exists – and knowing that their 
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costs of participating in it will be lower if they behave lawfully now, the prospective parties may 
also be deterred from socially wasteful activity ex ante. 
To understand how litigation games play out more concretely, suppose a plaintiff (π) and 
defendant (Δ) were contemplating litigating an issue (which could pertain to either civil or 
criminal liability).  Should litigation occur, the outcome will be a function of underlying 
procedural rules, the evidence produced by each side, and possibly a set of external factors.  
Accordingly, let the ultimate judgment (or “judgment function”) be denoted as J(x,y,z) where the 
arguments ∈  and ∈  denote measures of evidence presented by the plaintiff and the 
defendant (respectively). The argument ∈  denotes a vector of other extraneous state-
contingent considerations that are readily observable to the court, and that may (depending on 
policy and design decisions) be relevant to the judgment.   (These arguments may conceivably be 
vector values, as may the judgment function itself28). 
Embedded within the judgment function is a host of potential practical considerations in 
litigation, including substantive legal rules, policy considerations, and (significantly) BoP 
protocols for weighing the evidentiary productions of the parties.  Consequently, contributions 
within this literature diverge considerably with respect to the key ingredients of the judgment 
function. However, virtually all of these approaches commonly posit (with little loss of 
generality) that Jx > 0 and Jy < 0, so that larger amounts of evidence produced by the plaintiff 
generally enhance the judgment, while larger amounts of evidence produced by the defendant 
                                                            
28 The judgment function may be vector valued for a number of reasons.  For example, in many situations, the 
judgment may involve more than a mere transfer from the defendant to the plaintiff.  For example, a criminal 
prosecution might result in both a monetary sanction and a non-monetary punishment.  Another example is a civil 
case in which damages paid by the defendant are “decoupled” from those received by the plaintiff,  with part of the 
damages going to the state.  See Che & Polinsky (1991);  Choi & Sanchirico (2004).  Nevertheless, to keep things 
simple, I will constrain the discussion to scalar-valued terms. 
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dampen it.    (See, e.g., Daughety & Reinganum (2000) Bernardo et al. (2000), and Sanchirico 
(2008) for general discussions). 
 
Formal Analysis 
Consider, for example, a slight generalization of the litigation contest studied in Bernardo 
et al. (2000), who identify J with a function that assigns a liability probability to a case with 




The term b(z)>0 represents the (possibly state-contingent) “weight” that the defendant’s 
evidentiary showing is accorded relative to the plaintiff’s – what Bernardo et al. (2000) analogize 
to the strength of an initial assumption / presumption.   
Note that this framework presumes that any state-contingent considerations reflected in z 
must be fully observable by the court, reflecting any number of general policy commitments.  
There may also be a host of other considerations that are relevant, yet not directly observable to 
the court.  Most saliently, judicial actors are likely to be unable to observe the level of care 
undertaken by the defendant.  To reflect the distinction between easily observable facts and 
opaque ones, suppose the “complete” state of the world is denoted by Ω which can be partitioned 
into Ω ≡ Z,W , corresponding to components that are observable and non-observable to the 
court, respectively.  A key feature in evidence production games (not present in the decision-
theoretic framework) is that the parties’ strategic choices about how much evidence to produce is 
that such evidence can provide signals about the unobservable aspects of Ω (as discussed in 
greater detail below).29 
                                                            
29 See Sanchirico (2000 & 2001) for general discussions. 
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Evidence production models typically assume that evidence production is costly to both 
parties.  Denote the cost to the plaintiff and defendant, respectively, as cπ(x and c(y,), 
where , ∆ ∈ Ω . Significantly, note that the cost of providing evidence for each party is 
allowed to turn both on publicly observable information as well as private information of the 
parties.  While this assumption introduces some complexity, it is often a critically important 
ingredient of the evidence production contest approach.  In particular, if parties with different 
information (say, about their prior negligence) face differential costs of providing evidence, their 
performative behavior in court may signal credible evidence about that information—and in so 
doing allow the judgment function to provide a mechanism to screen (at least partially) for 
liability.   
To see more concretely how this screening mechanism might work, suppose that the 
parties are risk neutral, that the judgment function is given as in (5) above, fixing b(z) = 2, and 
that damages (conditional on liability) are fixed by substantive law at $100. Suppose further that 
the plaintiff and the defendant submit their evidence to the court simultaneously, and that the 
plaintiff faces a linear cost of evidence production given by cπ(x,) = x.  The defendant’s cost 
of evidence, in contrast, turns on whether she had previously acted negligently, and in particular 
assume that cΔ(y,Negligent)=2y and cΔ(y,Not Negligent)=y.  Finally, suppose that only the 
defendant knows with certainty whether she has previously behaved negligently, and that is 
common knowledge that negligent and non-negligent defendants are equally prevalent.  
It is easily verified in this setting that the equilibrium levels of evidence production 
consists of x=23.789 by the plaintiff, yN=12.492 by the negligent defendant, and yNN=22.594 by 
the non-negligent defendant.  Note that in equilibrium, the non-negligent defendant brings 
substantially more evidence into court than her negligent counterpart, since it is relatively cheap 
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for her to adduce evidence in her favor.  Consequently, the equilibrium probability of liability 
that ensues is approximately 49% for the negligent defendant and 22% for the non-negligent 
defendant.   That is, the court delivers a harsher expected penalty to the negligent defendant than 
it does to the non-negligent one.  This is significant for anyone interested in linking the role of 
evidence production to ex ante incentives for primary behavior (taken up in Section 4 below). 
Discussion 
An obvious advantage of the game theoretic approach is that the former explicitly 
provides a representation of the process by which litigants bring evidence into the courtroom.  
Consequently, it facilitates a number of insights into how their efforts and ultimate outcomes are 
affected by altering legal processes (through distortions to the judgment function). Moreover, the 
game-theoretic account allows one to analyze more completely the relationship between post-
injury litigation activity and pre-injury deterrence.  This richer account of litigation has some 
clear advantages over the decision-theoretic framework, where such litigation/deterrence 
tradeoffs are largely (though not completely) suppressed. For example, as Bernardo et al (2000) 
and Sanchirico (2000; 2001) both demonstrate, the signaling/screening advantages of a litigation 
contest come at the cost of inducing significant evidence production costs by the parties.  In 
some circumstances, these litigation inefficiencies can grow so large as to swamp the beneficial 
signaling and deterrence benefits (such as when the difference in evidence production costs of 
negligent and non-negligent parties is small).  In such situations, it may be optimal to push the 
applicable presumption / assumption in the direction of an irrebutability. 
 At the same time, the evidence production game approach to evidentiary burdens some 
distinct drawbacks too.  First, the most tractable functional forms for J(.) do not have obvious 
correspondences to the various institutional features of the BoP analyzed in Section 2. For 
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example, in the judgment function explored above, the term b(z) is effectively a proxy for 
burdens, presumptions/assumptions, and standards of proof all rolled into one. While it is 
possible to interpret an increased burden, a stronger presumption/assumption, or an enhanced 
standard through a change in the b(z) function, they tend not to have effects that are 
distinguishable from one another.   
Second, while the evidence production approach generally does a much better job than 
the decision-theoretic model at capturing the litigants’ incentives and behavior, it does a worse 
job at capturing the behavior of the fact-finder.  Indeed, in this class of models, the fact-finder is 
identified largely as an automaton, technocratically applying a judgment function. This 
representation can present some obvious difficulties, particularly if one concedes that the fact-
finder may be a strategic participant in the game.  For example, in the evidence production game 
analyzed above, evidence production decisions generated a “separating” equilibrium, where 
negligent defendants presented a relatively “low” amount of evidence when compared to non-
negligent defendants.  As a result, the posited judgment function assigned a greater equilibrium 
likelihood of liability to negligent defendants than to non-negligent ones.  But it still committed 
errors—negligent defendants were exonerated 51% of the time, and non-negligent defendants 
were erroneously held liable 22% of the time.  Were this judgment function applied by a 
sophisticated, Bayesian judge/jury, it would almost certainly understand the separating nature of 
the equilibrium. In turn, the fact-finder would plausibly be tempted to abandon the posited 
judgment function, and instead assign liability if and only if the defendant had produced a “low” 
amount of information according the separating equilibrium.  Anticipating that the fact-finder 
might change the rules, of course, the litigants themselves might change their own behavior, 
potentially upsetting the separating nature of the equilibrium.  The basic setup in the evidence 
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production framework (as presented above) does not easily allow for such strategic interplay 
between the litigants and a sophisticated fact-finder. 
Finally, as with the decision-theoretic approach, the continued necessity of committing to 
an express functional form for the judgment function may prove to be unduly restrictive for those 
interested in purely normative contributions, such as the optimal design of a system of procedure 
from the ground up.  To be sure, one could still use this approach to formulate modest normative 
prescriptions within (say) a particular family of forms.  While such an approach may work well 
for pragmatically grounded normative inquiries, the limited domain of the resulting prescriptions 
would not be particularly attractive in a more purely normative analysis. 
 
3. Hybrids: Game Theoretic Frameworks with a Bayesian Fact-Finder 
One potential approach for dealing with at least some of the objections noted above is to 
re-introduce the fact-finder as a strategic player who behaves in a sequentially rational fashion.  
Such a setup tends to resemble the general setup from the last subsection, but it imposes an 
additional “commitment” constraint on the fact finder, ruling out at least certain judgment 
functions that would require her to make sub-optimal or inaccurate decisions when called upon 
to decide the outcome of the case.   
For example, consider a similar framework as above, but suppose the fact-finder were a 
Bayesian motivated by judicial accuracy, and was sufficiently sophisticated to “decode” 
equilibrium play among the parties.  Such a fact finder would by definition respond to a 
completely separating equilibrium by assigning liability to the defendant if and only if the 
equilibrium reveals her to be negligent.  Consider how such a rule would play out in the 
framework developed above, where damages are fixed at $100, plaintiffs and non-negligent 
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defendants have marginal evidence production costs of $1, and negligent defendants face 
marginal evidence production costs of $2.  As demonstrated above, the judgment function 
posited in equation (5) would no longer be viable if the fact-finder always inverted the 
equilibrium.  However, other forms of judgment function may be consistent with the fact-
finder’s hypothesized commitment to accurate adjudication.  Consider, for example, the 
following judgment function: 
, , 1 20 85
0
. (6) 
It can be easily confirmed that this judgment function supports a fully separating Bayesian 
perfect equilibrium in which plaintiffs produce evidence of x=20, non-negligent defendants 
produce evidence of yNN=85, and negligent defendants produce no evidence at all.  Moreover, 
such a framework gives rise to liability if, and only if, defendants are negligent, thereby ensuring 
that the fact-finder can commit to the decision rule ex post.30 
 The addition of a commitment constraint for the fact-finder provides an intuitive way to 
combine the decision-theoretic and evidence production models.  In fact, the example above 
even lends itself to an interpretation of the burdens of persuasion and presumption.  (That is, the 
plaintiff’s initial burden of production is satisfied by producing at least 20 units of evidence, at 
which point the burden of production switches to the defendant, who can rebut it by producing 
85 units of evidence). 
 Nevertheless, it is important to note the limitations of this approach. First, by definition, 
the imposition of a commitment condition narrows the range of judgment functions that are 
available to implement.  This can have real welfare costs: As is well known in the principal/agent 
                                                            
30 This does not imply, of course that the judgment function posited in the text is optimal, and there exist others that 
are less costly to implement but equally informative.  (Indeed, the function is not even particularly robust to various 
equilibrium refinements common to the signaling literature).  That said, the example in the previous section was not 
assumed to be optimal either. 
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optimal contracting literature, good incentive devices tend to reveal information that the 
principal would ideally wish later to exploit, but her obvious temptation to do so necessarily 
would distort the very behavior that revealed that information in the first instance.  Here too, 
non-commitment by the fact-finder necessarily limits the types of institutional procedures that 
are possible, and as a result the set of achievable outcomes is reduced (possibly in a welfare 
reducing way).  One interesting and provocative implication of this observation is that a “good” 
system of evidence from a welfare perspective may be one that utilizes relatively “dumb” (or at 
least non-reflective) fact-finding processes—which are neither designed nor function to make 
nuanced assessments of truth, but are instead gauged to incentivize behavior, distribute risk, and 
affect other allocative consequences between defendants, plaintiffs, and broader society. 
 To the extent this last observation is valid, it may raise difficult questions about how (and 
even why) the commitment issue comes about in the first place.  If the fact-finder were truly 
motivated by welfare concerns, then the fact that she may wish to commit to making 
classification errors in the process should not itself be objectionable, so long as the system she is 
applying induces optimal behavior.  Hence, perhaps the best motivation for this approach is to 
assume that the fact-finder may also be an agent, and may therefore be motivated by factors that 
are either extraneous to social welfare or enter differently in social welfare calculus (such as 
accuracy per se, minimizing workload, and so forth).  This possibility is taken up below. 
 Finally, just as with the evidence production approaches with commitment, the simple 
addition of a commitment constraint does not ensure that the class of judgment function being 
studied is sufficiently broad to satisfy purely normative scholars interested in “optimal” process 
design.   To engage in this enterprise requires a more general approach, less wedded to a 
particular class of processes or functional forms.  It is to this last literature I now turn. 
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4. Mechanism Design Approaches 
 A final significant strand in the BoP literature endeavors to engage more directly in broad 
institutional design.  That is, rather than focusing on a particular set of functional forms for 
designing legal procedure, the mechanism design (MD) approach endeavors to derive the 
characteristics of an “optimal” set of fact-finding processes BoP from a set of first principles 
about social objectives, individual incentives, and information constraints.  This approach can 
yield powerful insights useful to those interested in normative analysis and is increasingly 
popular.  (See, Sobel 1985; Shin 1998; Sanchirico 1995, 2000, 2001; Bull & Watson 2004; 
Demougin & Fluet. 2006.  Cf. Cooter & Emons 2004). 
 The kernel of the MD approach focuses on structuring legal process from the “ground 
up”, but with consistent attention to how design choices alter and affect the incentives of the 
parties both (a) to participate in the process; and (b) to “play by the rules” – i.e., reveal truthful 
information to the fact-finder – when litigation occurs.  These two key design constraints are 
sometimes referred to (respectively) as the parties’ “Individual Rationality” and “Incentive 
Compatibility” conditions.  Unlike the game-theoretic approach described above, the MD 
approach does not commit to a particular judgment function. Rather, it endeavors to derive an 
“optimal” one in the sense of maximizing economic welfare according to any possible set of 
institutional rules, but without violating to the two aforementioned types of constraints.   
 A handy tool that many MD approaches employ is to concentrate on (so-called) “direct 
revelation mechanisms,” which are processes where the litigants are simply asked to report to the 
fact-finder all of relevant information they privately know about the case (e.g., their extent of 
precautions, level of risk preferences, extent of damage, etc.), and the fact-finder delivers a 
binding judgment and instructed behavior based on those reports.  While there is nothing (in 
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principle) that would prevent the litigants from attempting to deceive the fact-finder when 
making their reports to the fact-finder, the “trick” of the MD approach is to design a set of 
decision functions that anticipate these incentives, account for them, and alter payoffs to make 
truth-telling optimal for all parties.31  
More formally, and utilizing the notation from the previous sections, under the MD 
approach the parties are asked to report their own private information , ∆  to the fact finder.  
Recall that this information is not directly verifiable to the mechanism designer, and thus nothing 
necessarily precludes misrepresentation by the parties.  Thus, let , ∆  denote the actual 
reports (truthful or not) submitted by the parties to the court. Once the parties have submitted 
, ∆ , the mechanism announces (i) quantities of evidence that the parties are required to 
produce based on their reports ( , ∆; , and , ∆; , respectively), along with (ii) an 
expected final judgment , ∆; , which the defendant damages to the plaintiff.
32  Together, 
these three decisions constitute the decision mechanism of the fact finder, collectively denoted as 
Γ , ∆|  .  As before, assume that the cost to the plaintiff and defendant of producing these 
levels of evidence are c(x,) and c(y,), respectively. 
Using this notation, any adjudication mechanism that induces both truth-telling and 
participation by both the plaintiff and defendant must satisfy the following four conditions:  
(ICπ):   ∈ ∆ , ∆; , ∆; ,  
(ICΔ):   ∆ ∈ ∆ , ∆; ∆ , ∆; , ∆  
(IRπ):   ∆ , ∆; , ∆; , 0 
(7) 
                                                            
31 The ability to limit one’s attention solely to mechanisms that induce truth-telling in equilibrium is sometimes 
referred to as the “revelation principle.”  It is generally applicable in most litigation settings, but perhaps not 
universally so. 
32 .The actual judgment may be stochastic, and can reflect both liability and damages assessments. 
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(IRΔ):   ∆ , ∆; ∆ , ∆; ,  
Conditions (ICπ) and (ICΔ), the “incentive compatibility” constraints, essentially require 
that truthful disclosure is a Nash equilibrium under the posited mechanism (assuming that 
truthful disclosure is a normative goal). Conditions (IRπ) and (IRΔ) the individual rationality 
constraints, requires that it be rational for the plaintiff and defendant to participate in the game. 
Thus, Condition (IRπ) requires that the plaintiff’s expected payoff in equilibrium be no lower 
than simply choosing not to litigate (and received payoff of zero). A similar interpretation 
applies to (IR), which requires that the defendant’s expected payoff be no lower than what he 
would expect to pay in a default judgment. 33 
 Finally, and common with the analysis of the previous section, a direct revelation 
mechanism may permit the fact-finder to learn private information from the litigants.  If the fact-
finder herself is unable to commit to any type of judgment mechanism, then there may be 
another constraint on the set of admissible mechanisms in light of what the fact-finder is able to 
commit to given her own preferences (e.g., truth-seeking, effort minimizing, etc.).  Denoting the 
set of mechanisms to which a fully-informed fact-finder could commit as (,), this would 
suggest a fifth constraint on the design problem: 
(CFF):    Γ , ∆| ⊆ Γ∗ , ∆  (8) 
As should be clear by this point (perhaps painfully so), the MD approach is easily the 
most abstract and technically demanding framework discussed in this chapter.  Moreover, 
                                                            
33 Condition (IRΔ) is not a mirror image of Conditions (IRπ) because the defendant does not voluntarily 
appear in court.  Instead, (IRΔ) simply places an upper limit (K) on the damages the defendant can lose in 
a default judgment, which in civil cases is plausibly the defendant’s bankruptcy threshold.  When the 
defendant is well capitalized, (IRΔ) need not constitute a binding constraint.In criminal cases, in contrast, the 
situation is frequently a bit more complicated, since the judgment might accord non-zero-sum payoffs to the 
prosecutor and defendant. 
33 
 
characterizing the solution to an MD problem is also a technical and intricate enterprise, and 
therefore it is beyond the scope of the current inquiry.   
Nevertheless, the mechanism design approach can be a powerful tool, particularly for 
normative analysis of the BoP.  An “optimal” mechanism generally represents the best possible 
outcome that one could hope to achieve in a non-cooperative setting.  Consequently, its 
characteristics represent an enormously useful benchmark for comparing, assessing, and 
rationalizing current institutional practices. Moreover, the MD approach can sometimes deliver 
helpful suggestions about what should or should not matter in designing a “better” evidentiary 
system. 
Yet the strengths of the MD framework are also its limitations. Since it is focused on 
deriving optimal rules, it is not particularly effective at analyzing the economic effects of 
existing BoP institutions. More to the point, mechanism design approaches generally do not 
produce a complete description of processes by which their outcomes can be achieved. They 
merely characterize what sorts of outcomes are possible under ideal circumstances.  
Consequently, even if one were confident about the desirability of an optimal mechanism, it 
might be very difficult in practice to build a set of institutions capable of generating those 
outcomes. 
 Second, even the normative application of the mechanism design approach requires one 
to articulate exactly what the appropriate welfare function is. There are a number of factors that 
may go into that decision, and ultimately this is a dimension on which many existing 
contributions to the literature (both within the mechanism design tradition and outside it) tend to 
diverge.  It is to this last substantive distinction I now turn. 
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C. Scope of Inquiry: Ex Ante, Litigation, or Both? 
Perhaps one of the most substantial (and in some ways vexing) challenges to normative 
applications of law and economics to the BoP is that of articulating what, precisely, the 
appropriate social welfare goal (or goals) should be.  While most economists tend to embrace 
welfare measures that correspond (roughly) with various measures of efficiency, the appropriate 
domain of an efficiency measure is itself somewhat elusive within this literature.   
Part of the reason for this elusiveness stems from the traditional distinction that the law 
(and many legal scholars) have placed on procedural versus substantive rules.  One way to 
appreciate this distinct (at least heuristically) appears in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Elements of Welfare and Substance vs. Process 
 
The figure represents five relevant economic considerations for the function of law: (A) 
Transaction/Bargaining costs; (B) Investment, Reliance and/or Precaution Costs, (C) Incidence / 
Likelihood of Harm; (D) Adjudication / Litigation costs; and (E) Sanctions and Enforcement 
Activity.  Although these categories are almost certainly not exclusive, they are all clearly 
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relevant for economic analysis, and are intuitive components of virtually any economic welfare 
measure. (For example, a standard Calabresian efficiency analysis might ask what sets of 
substantive and procedural rules would tend to minimize the total expected costs from each of 
the five categorical dimensions illustrated in the figure). 
At the risk of simplification, it is largely accurate to state that economic analysis of most 
substantive legal rules—such as liability or negligence standards, remedies, affirmative defenses, 
and the like have typically focused on how such rules affect the activities in categories (A), (B), 
and (C).  And, at the same time, most economic analysis of the legal process—such as pleading 
standards, filing fees, and, notably, burdens of proof—tends to fall most naturally into steps (D) 
and (E).  In other words, at least initial scholarship on burdens of proof largely concentrated on 
how they affected the incidence and distribution of costs in litigation, as well as the cost and 
accuracy of trial outcomes. 
This characterization, of course, is also somewhat of a gross over-simplification. Even 
moderately well-read legal scholars will recognize immediately that most claims about the 
distinction between form and process have serious conceptual problems.   Procedural rules, they 
will assert, can profoundly (even if indirectly) affect deterrence, proof, and available remedies, 
and vice versa.  Indeed, plausibly since the very introduction of the Substance/Process distinction 
(largely thought to have come from Blackstone), legal commentators have expressed frustration 
at it, describing it in turns as “vague,” “imprecise,” “chameleon-like,” and “superbly fuzzy” 
(Main 2010).   
Nevertheless, the distinction is one that to this day animates legal practice, and the 
trajectory of economic analysis of legal burdens has largely followed a similar course.  Early 
contributions in this literature tended to focus predominantly on welfare measures that pertained 
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solely to litigation and beyond.  Within this domain, a number of considerations are at the 
forefront, such as how the BoP interacts with expended litigation costs, delay costs, judicial 
accuracy, and the likelihood / terms of settlement.  (Rubinfeld & Sappington 1987; Easterbrook 
1984).   
More recently, however, law and economics scholars have begun to deliver insights into 
how elements of litigation (including burdens) are likely to have feedback effects on primary 
behavior of plaintiffs and defendants—the subject matter that is most closely associated with 
substantive law (rather than procedural rules).  One set of important contributions to the 
literature (most notably, Polinsky & Shavell (2000), and P’ng (1986)) study a decision-theoretic 
model of adjudication in a standard deterrence framework to analyze the effects of judicial error.  
Within this framework, judicial errors tend to dilute deterrence incentives, reducing prospective 
liability risk from bad behavior and increasing risk from good behavior.  Consequently, it is 
generally welfare improving to attempt to reduce the incidence of error.  Perhaps more 
interesting is the observation that under a number of relatively general conditions, the efficiency 
costs of false positives and false negatives are symmetric, giving some justification to a 
preponderance standard (which equally weighs Type 1 and Type 2 errors). 
Another cluster of papers in law and economics beginning soon began to push that 
analytic step a notch further, explicitly studying how strategic behavior during litigation interacts 
with primary activities.  (See, e.g., Sanchirico 1995; 2008; Bernardo et al. 2000; Demougian & 
Fluet 2006).  These papers tend to tie game theoretic or mechanism design frameworks to models 
of deterrence.  This is an area that has been particularly fertile during the last decade or so.  By 
way of example, Bernardo et al (2000) develop a game-theoretic model of evidence production 
that explicitly links ex ante deterrence and the standard of proof at trial.  Using this model, they 
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illustrate how pro-defendant reforms can have two countervailing effects.  First, the hypothesized 
reform makes it less likely (all else constant) for plaintiffs to prevail in trial and thus less 
attractive for them to litigate; but second, defendants have an incentive to engage in fewer 
precautions ex ante, because of the protection the procedural reform affords them. In fact, 
Bernardo et al (2000) demonstrate that this second effect can easily be the dominant one – so that 
following a defendant-friendly procedural reform, one would predict an increase in the number 
of lawsuits filed as well as an increase in plaintiffs’ overall win rate. 
Sanchirico (2008) provides a cogent analysis of burdens of persuasion and production in 
a plausible game-theoretic framework linking ex ante litigation to strategic evidence production 
in trial.  He offers an insightful justification for the possibly curious practice of usually placing 
the burden of persuasion (and initial production) on the party who is not the target of the law’s 
deterrence efforts (e.g., the injured plaintiff and not the defendant).  Specifically, his model 
posits that the exercise of due care ex ante by a prospective defendant is likely to have two 
effects on later evidence production costs:  (a) It will reduce the prospective defendant’s costs of 
producing exculpatory evidence should injury occur; and (b) it will increases the plaintiff’s cost 
of producing inculpatory evidence. The combined effects of this shift enhance economic welfare 
by making it both more likely that an injured plaintiff will file suit only against negligent 
defendants, and more likely that non-negligent defendants can prevail (cheaply) should the 
plaintiff does sue.34 
                                                            
34 Although Sanchirico (2008) does not analyze the issue squarely, his framework would also seem useful in 
understanding why in some situations tort law places the burden of production on the defendant, such as in 
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.  Such cases are plausibly typified by plaintiffs whose access to 
inculpatory evidence is both highly limited (e.g., they were not conscious) and likely unaffected by the defendant’s 
care level.  In such situations, the sorting / screening benefits of burdening the plaintiff highlighted by Sanchirico 
(2008) tend to diminish substantially, if not completely. 
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Other interesting contributions outside the tort setting also link primary activity to 
evidence production.  Lando (2006), for example, develops a model in which a large number of 
wrongful convictions might be efficient if there is high serial correlation across offences.  
Bernhardt and Nosal (2004) study the bankruptcy question of which distressed firms to liquidate 
or preserve.  They demonstrate that even when a reliable technology exists for discerning “high 
quality” firms (who would efficiently be bailed out), it may make sense to eschew such 
technologies since the knowledge of a future bailout would induce high quality firms to take 
excessive risk ex ante.   Demougin & Fluet (2006; 2008) work within a mechanism design 
framework, demonstrating within a special setting (where costs of producing evidence are of 
second order importance) that a preponderance standard can implement the allocation of an 
optimal mechanism.   
  
4. Moving Forward 
 Although the theoretical literature on the BoP is now quite mature, it is in many ways still 
in a conceptual growth spurt.  There are at least four challenges for this literature going forward.  
The first challenge is categorical. As noted above, most contributions within the field tend to fall 
into one of four modeling classifications: decision-theoretic; game-theoretic; hybrid; and 
mechanism design.  Each of them generates particular and helpful insights about how to 
understand and design evidentiary procedures.  However, until recently, there has been little 
work to synthesize them.  (This chapter and contemporaneous and important work by Kaplow 
(2011; 2012) may go some distance to address this issue).    It is likely that mechanism design 
frameworks have the most promise for making the literature more parsimonious, but (as noted 
above) this approach faces significant challenges to implementation.  A significant amount of 
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theoretical work has yet to be done on deriving extensive form implementations of optimal 
mechanisms within familiar procedural environments.  Moreover, although behavioral 
economics and prospect theory have penetrated this area of L&E just as elsewhere, there are 
likely many more opportunities for theoretically minded scholars to develop models of burdens 
incorporating prospect theory, anchoring effects, and bounded rationality. 
The second issue is empirical.  Particularly when one considers how the BoP interacts 
with primary activities and deterrence, the strategic dynamics quickly become complex, 
depending critically on deeply embedded modeling parameters.  Consequently, it is difficult to 
know what to make of the growing theoretical literature in the absence of high quality 
experimental and empirical work to help calibrate the underlying theoretical models. That work 
is only just beginning, but is decidedly underway.35 
The final issue is pragmatic and political.  Particularly for those interested in normative 
prescriptions that emanate from this literature, it is now relatively clear that within a number of 
realistic factual settings, an “optimal” burden of proof likely diverges (perhaps wildly) from the 
familiar legal procedures that have been part and parcel of legal practice for decades if not 
centuries.  In such cases, it seems highly implausible that legal institutions are likely to embrace 
reform proposals with open arms.  Perhaps a much better tack for those interested in normative 
prescriptions is to advocate the use of non-standard burdens in arbitration proceedings, where 
judicial processes are more of a matter of contract (Hadfield & Talley 2006).  Not only would 
such applications constitute a ready market for new innovations, but they would also possibly act 
as important field experiments for them. 
  
                                                            
35 See, e.g., Zamir & Ritov (2012) who present an intriguing set of experiments that suggest omission and status quo 
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